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Abstract-In this paper stochastic versions of three differential games, namily: the blocking 
game[l] (Chap. 6) the game of patrolling channel[l] (Chap. 9) and the collision avoidance 
game[2] (Chap. 8) are considered. The common factor of these differential games is that all 
three of them are modelled by the same set of stochastic differential equations. In each of the 
games; sufficient conditions on optimal strategies in the case of complete observation; and 
sufficient conditions on weak optimal strategies in the case of partial observations; are derived. 
In the cases of complete observation, optimal strategies are computed for a variety of cases. 
In the cases of partial observation, procedures for computing weak suboptimal strategies are 
suggested, and these are computed for a variety of examples. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper stochastic versions of three differential games each involving two players, P 
and E, are considered. These games are: the blocking game[l] (Chap. 6), the game of 
patrolling a channel[l] (Chap. 9), and the collision avoidance game[2] (Chap. 8). The 
common factor of the differential games considered here is that all three of them are 
modelled by the same set of stochastic differential equations. In each of the games, two 
possible information structures, available to both players P and E, are introduced. The 
first possibility is that both P and E have complete observation of the state of the game. 
The second possibility is that P has complete observation of the state of the game while 
E has only partial observation of the state of the game which is what happens in the first 
and second games; or that both players have only partial observation of the state of the 
game as happens in the third game. In each of the games sufficient conditions on optimal 
feedback strategies, in the case of complete observation; and sufficient conditions on weak 
optimal feedback strategies, in the cases of partial observation; are derived. In the cases 
of complete observation, optimal feedback strategies are computed for a variety of cases. 
In the cases of partial observation, procedures for computing weak suboptimal feedback 
strategies are suggested, and these are computed for a variety of cases. 
2.1 Introduction 
2. THE BLOCKING GAME 
The horizontal lines of Fig. 1 denote boundaries of an open domain F. Two players 
P and E are moving in F. The player E wishes to reach the upper boundary of F before 
being intercepted by P, while the player P wishes to intercept E in the domain F before 
E reaches the upper boundary of F. Given 6 > 0, we say that P intercepts E if E is in the 
c-neighbourhood of P. We assume that there exists a detection range 1, between P and 
E and that the game continues as long as the horizontal distance between P and E is less 
than I,. Suppose the velocities (u,, sin 4, -v,, cos 4) of P and (-4 sin 8, u, cos 0) of E have 
constant given magnitudes v0 and u, respectively, whereas P and E may assign the direction 
4 and 0 correspondingly. Furthermore, the velocities (a0 sin 4, - u0 cos 4) of P and 
( - u. sin 8, u, cos 0) of E are perturbed by two R2-valued independent Gaussian white 
noise proceses respectively. The equations of motion for the game are thus 
dx,, = v. sin 4 dt + y, dB, 
dx,= -v,cos4dt +o,dW, 
(I) 
tThis work was partially supported by a grant from Control Data. 
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Fig. 1. The domain F and the players P and E. 
where xp = (x,,,x*,) denotes the coordinates of P, and 
1 
dx,, = -u,sintI dt +Y2dBz 
dx,,=u,cos6dt +qdW, (2) 
where xE = (xIE, xZE) denotes the coordinates of E. {(B,(t), B,(t)), t 2 O> and 
{(W,(t), E7z(t)), t 2 0) are mutually independent W2-valued standard Wiener processes. y,, 
and oi, i = 1,2, are given positive numbers. 
Denote 
x, BY,, GY,, x, Ax,, - xIp = y, (see Fig. 1) (3) 
then, equations (l)-(2) yield 
dx, = -v,coscb dt + g,dW, 
dx,=u,cosOdt +o,dW, t>o 
i dxj= -(u,sintI +v,sinb)dt +o,dW, 
(4) 
where a,d W, = y2dB2 - y,dB,, i.e. W, is a standard Wiener process, and 
aE = y12 + y22. Thus, W = {(W,(t), W*(t), W3(t)), t 2 0} is an W3-valued stan- 
dard Wiener process. 
Equations (4) constitute the state equations of the game. 
Denote by 0 the class of all functions (strategies) v = ($,0) = ((b(x), 19(x)), x E&‘~}, 
x = (x,, x2, x3), such that 4 :W3+W and 8 : 9f3-+92 are measurable and satisfy (4(x)1 < R 
and (O(x)1 I n for all x ~99 3. Let v E 0 and x E@. Then, [3], equations (4) determine a 
stochastic process i,’ = {i,‘(t) = (i:,,(t), i:,2(t), il;,3(t)), t 2 O> such that: 
(i) on a probability space (52,9, P,“), [,’ is a weak solution to (4) in the sense that P,y’ 
is the unique solution to the martingale problem for Y(v), [3], where the operator Y(v) 
is given by (5); 
(ii) c,‘(O) = x, P,‘-almost surely; 
(iii) the family {PXy, x ~9~) is strong Markov[3]; and 
Z(v) V(x) = - v0 cos 48 V(x)/ax, + uOcos 88 V(x)/ax, - (uO sin 8 + v. sin +)a V(x)/ax, 
for any VEC,“(W~). 
S(v) is the weak infinitesimal operator of the family {(it”, P,Y”), x ~9’) of strong 
Markov processes. 
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Denote by D,,, K, T and D the following sets in W3: 
Do” {x : 0 < x, < 1, i = 1,2; lx31 < 1,}, 
K~(x:6<xi~I-6, i=1,2; 1x31 5 I, - 6; (x1 - x*)2 + xj2 5 c’} (7) 
Ta(x:kx,~f-d,x,=f, jx3/-<lI-6; (x,-xx,)2+x322(~+a)2}, (8) 
DADO--(KUT), (9) 
where I, 2 I > 0, a > 0,O < 6 + a < I and 0 < 6 4 I are given numbers. Define the first exit 
time of iv’ from D, 
z(x; v)P 
i 
inf {t : [,‘(t)$D when i,‘(O) = x ED} (10) 
0 if i,‘(O)=x$D 
co if [,Y(t@D for all t 2 0. 
The constraint /x3] c I, in (6) (and Ix31 I l1 - 6 in (7~(8)) re p resents the condition that the 
game continues as long as (distance (P, E)),, < I,. If [,‘(r(x; v)) EK we say that player E 
has been intercepted by P in F before either P or E has left Do. In this case P wins the 
game. If on the other hand, [,‘(z(x;v))~T, then we say that E reached its goal of arriving 
at the upper boundary of F, before being intercepted by P, and before either P or E had 
left D,. In this case E wins the game. 
In any case, if for some t 2 0, c,‘(t) $ D, then we disregard the subsequent motion. Note 
that if c,‘(r(x; v)) E DO’ - T then the game terminates with both players losing the game. 
Define the following class of strategies 
(11) 
where E,’ denotes the expectation operator with respect to P,‘, and define the following 
functionals: 
V,(x; v) = V,(x; 4, WP,v({i,‘(r(x; V))EK}), x E& v = (4,0)E v, (12) 
Vz(x;v)= V,(x;~,e)8Px’({i,‘(z(x;v))ET)), XE& v =(&QEU. ’ (13) 
Two possible information structures available to P and E are considered here. The first 
possibility is that both players P and E have complete observation of c,’ = (l,‘(t), t 2 01. 
The second possibility is the case where player P has complete observation of c,’ but player 
E, which is faster than P in this case, has complete observation only of c;,* = {C:,Jt), 
t 2 0). In this case the strategies assume the following form v = (&0) = ((4(x), 0(x2)), 
x EFS?~}. Thus the two following problems are considered in this section. 
(a) Strategies using complete observation of the state. The problem treated for this 
information structure is : find a strategy v * = (4 *, O*)E U such that 
Vr(x;4*,8*)2 V,(x;&8*) for any (d,e*)EU and allxED (14) 
V&4*,B*)L V,(x;4*,0) for any (4*,e)EU and all XED. (15) 
The strategy v* = ($*, 0*) is called a Nash equilibrium point in pure strategies (NEP 
strategy) of the differential game[4]. 
(b) Strategies using partial observation of the state. Let 
up& {V E u : v = (4, e) = {(4(x), e(x,)), x ~93). (16) 
A straightforward approach would call for solving the problem given by (14~(15) but 
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where (4 *, 0*), ($,0*) and (4 *, 0) belong to U,,. Owing to the form of the strategies vE U,, 
it follows that the problem considered here is a problem of a stochastic differential game 
under partial observation. This implication excludes the possibility of deriving imple- 
mentable conditions of min-max dynamic programming type on the Nash equilibrium 
points as are derived in Subsection 2.2 (on strategies using complete observation of the 
state). Stochastic differential games under partial observation have been considered by 
many authors during the last years (for example see [5-81 and the references cited there). 
In all of these works, the problems dealt with are linear while the problem considered here 
is nonlinear. 
In [9] a stochastic differential game of two players P and E, defined on a bounded 
domain in g4, is considered. The game is modelled by a set of nonlinear stochastic 
differentia! equations, and two cases of partial observation information structures 
available to the players, are treated. For each of the given information structures, sufficient 
conditions on weak optimal feedback strategies is derived. Also, procedures for computing 
weak suboptimal feedback strategies are suggested, and these are computed for a variety 
of cases. The techniques and procedures developed in [9] were adopted in the present paper 
for the problems given here, and were applied in the solution of these problems. Due to 
its geometry, the problems treated in [9] are good test cases for the techniques developed 
there, since there the optimal strategy of E can be guessed beforehand. Thus the results 
obtained in [9] were encouraging enough for deploying the same techniques developed 
there for less obvious differential games as treated here. For studies dealing with the 
existence of saddle points and optimal strategies in stochastic differential games, the reader 
is advised to consult [10-131. 
In this section, the approach to the stochastic differential game posed here, in the case 
where the strategies use partial observation of the state, is as follows. Define 
Jdv > a I (1 - I’,(x; v))* dx, v E U,. (17) RI 
Suppose v* = (4 *, 0*) E U,, be a strategy for which (14) and (15) are satisfied for any 
(4,6*) E U, and (C#I *, 0) E Up respectively. Then 
and 
V,(x; 4*, 0*) 2 V,(x; &0*) for any (4, e*)e Up and all x ED,, (18) 
Jz(4*, e*> s J2(4*, 0) for any (4*, 0)E U,,. (19) 
A strategy (c#J’, (3”) E U,, for which 
V,(x; $O, 0”) 2 V,(x; &0”) for any (+,8O)E Up and all x ED,, 
J2(4’, eo) I J2(4’, 0) for any (40,e)q 
(20) 
(21) 
will here be called a weak optimal Nash equilibrium point (WONEP) strategy. Thus for case 
(b) of information structure, WONEP strategies will be sought. 
2.2 Strategies using complete observation of the state 
In this subsection, sufficient conditions are derived on Nash equilibrium points in pure 
strategies (NEP strategies) of the differential game. Let 9 denote the class of all functions 
V = V(x) such that : V is continuous on the closure Do of Do; and twice continuously 
differentiable on D; 8V/ax, and cY’V/~X,~ are in L,(D,), i = 1,2,3. 
In the sequel, the following lemma will be used. Its proof is given in the Appendix. 
LEMMA 1 
Given v = (4, e)E U, let I/,, V*E&@ satisfy 
Y($, 0) V,(x) = 0, XED, i = 1,2 (22) 
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?‘,(x)=l, XEK; V,(x)=O, x$D,, (23) 
V*(x)= 1, XET; V,(x)=O, XEKU(&,~- T) (24) 
(where D,’ denotes the complement of D,). Then 
V,(x) = V,(x; v) = PXy({SJz(x; v))EK}), x do (25) 
and 
V,(x) = V,(x; v) = P,‘((i,‘(z(x; V))E T>), x do. (26) 
THEOREM 1 
Suppose there exists a strategy v * = (4 *, 19 *) E U and functions VI’, V,’ E L@ such that 
0 = ma; 9(4, e*)V,‘(x) = 2’(4*, e*)V,“(x), x ED, (27) 
(6 LQ*)E 0 
0 = ma; eY(4*, e)V,“(x) = Ic;p(&*, ~*)V,“(X), x ED; (28) 
(9’. 6% u 
V,“(x)= 1, XEK; V,“(x)=O, x#D,, (29) 
V;(x)= 1, XET; V,“(x)=O, x~Ku(Do’-T). (30) 
Then 
V,‘(x) = P;({cl;‘(r(x; v*))EK)) 2 P:+.p’({l:~*p)(t(~; 4, ~*))EK}) (31) 
for any (~$,e*) E U and all x ~rs, 
VIo(x) = P;({j;(z(x; v*)) E T)) 2 P y’*“‘({~~~‘q~(x; c#J*, e))E T)) 
for any (#*, 8)EU and all XGD, (32) 
where v* = (c$*, e*). 
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in the Appendix. For an alternative proof of Theorem 
1 under different assumptions see [14]. 
By assuming that there exists a strategy v* = (4 *, f?*)E U and functions V,O, Vzo~ _Q 
which satisfy (27)-(30) it follows that a NEP strategy may be found by solving the 
following problem: 
U(4, e)V,(x) = 0, x ED, i = 1,2. (33) 
V-,(x)=1, XEK; V&x)=0, x$Do, (34) 
V2(x)= 1, XET; V,(x) = 0, x E K U (Do’ - T), (35) 
where 
COs4(x) = -(~T/,(x)ldxJld,(x) sin4(x) = -(~3V,(x)/dx,)/A,(~) (36) 
me(x) = (~~V,(X)/~JX,)/~,(X) sine(x) = -(av,(~)/d~,)/d,(~) (37) 
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d,(x) = [(aV,(x)/ax,)2 + (a V,(x)/axJ2]“‘, Al(X) = [(aV,(x)/ax,)2 + (aV,(x)/dx,)2]‘:2. (38) 
If (33)-(38) have a unique solution (VI, V,) with I’,, V2eg and ($,0), as determined by 
(36)-(38), is in U, then v = (4, f3) is a NEP strategy. Equations (33~(38) have here been 
solved iteratively by using an upwind finite-differences method as described for example, 
in [15]. 
2.3 Strategies using partial observation of the state 
In this subsection, sufficient conditions are derived on weak optimal Nash equilibrium 
point (WONEP) strategies. The following lemma will be used in the derivation of these 
conditions. 
LEMMA 2 
Let H be a Hilbert space, B a subset of H. Let Vd be an element of H, V&B. Then 
in order that an element V’E B should satisfy 
(39) 
it is sufficient that there should exist an element I,G E H such that 
(b) I) = v, - I/O. 
(40) 
(41) 
The proof of Lemma 2 is given in the Appendix. 
Let H = L,(D,) and denote 
upo”(v EUp: Vi(*;v)E9, i = 1,2 and satisfy equations (22~(24)). 
Let v, = (4,19”) E U, and suppose that 4” and c/,O& satisfy 
(42) 
0 = max Y(e$6”)V,“(x) = 9(4’, e’)V,“(x), x ED 
W%“~,, 
(43) 
V,“(x) = 1, x E K; V,‘(x) = 0, x 4 Do. (44) 
Then, from the proof of Th&rem 1 it follows that 
V?(x) = Pf({C(z(x; VO))EK)) 2 V(x;v,) 
for any v1 = (4, 0”) E UP, and all x E Do, (45) 
where v” = (40, eo) E up,. 
Define the following operators: 
Y(4) V(x) G - u. cos f#d V(x)/dx, - u. sin &? V(x)/ax, + 
and 
~~22, v = (4, e)E up, (46) 
~*(~>Q(x)~vo~[cos~Q(x)]/~x, + uoa[sin4Q(x)]/ax, + i i a”a2Q(x)/ax, 
0 I-1 
(47) 
for any Q such that T*(c#J)Q EL,(D,), v = (4, f3)c U,,,. 
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Let v2 = (4’, 0)~ U,,,, and let Q. be such that U*(~“)Qo~L,(Do) and Qo(x) = 0, x $D,. 
Since 
Y(b”, 13) V,(x; 4’, 0) = 0, a.e. in Do, (4’, 0) E U,, (48) 
it follows that 
VAX; 4’3 Q)~*(4°)Qo(x)dx = 
X s ’ Qo(xW'(4">f'dx; 4’3 0) dx + (a,2/2) ss ” (~Qo(xYWMx) dx, dx, 
=~~~~-cosn(x~)~~,,fipi,ii,,;d”_&),~:l)dx,dx~dx~ 
Qo(-w h(X; (b”, wXd d4 dX3 dX2 / ss ‘I + (~zZ/2> @Qo(x )lWZAx ) dx, dx, > 0 -4 
where IAx)= 1 if xETand IAx)= if x$7’. 
In order to make use of Lemma 2 let II/ = _Y*($‘)QO and 
B = (vz(. ;v2) :V+ upo>, v2 = (40, e), 
(49) 
(50) 
then equations (40) and (49) yield 
Qo(x)(a VAX; 4’2 0 )/ax,) d-q dx, dx, 
Qo(x )(a b(x ; 4 ‘, 8 )/ax,) dxi dx, d-x, 
’ ‘I 
+ (azZ/2> ss W)(~Qo(xYW dx, dx, . (51) 0 -/I 
In order to satisfy (41) it is sufficient to take V,(x) = 1, x E Do, and to choose Q. such that 
_Y*(c/J~)Q~(x) = 1 - V2(x; 4’, 0”), a.e. in Do; Qo(x) = 0, x $ Do, (52) 
where 8’ is determined by (51). 
The following theorem is a straightforward conclusion of this subsection. 
THEOREM 2 
Suppose that v” = (@O, f2”)E Up,; v.( .; v”) E 23, i = 1,2 and Q. satisfy 
1 
~(40, eo) iqx; vo) = 0, XED, i= 1,2 
?‘,(x;v”)= 1, XEK; V&x; v”) = 0, x#Do 
Vz(x;vo)= 1, XE:T; V,(x;v”)=O XEK U (D,‘- T) 
2’*(4°)Qo(x) = 1 - V2(x; v’), a.e. in Do; Qo(x) = 0, x #Do, 
(53) 
(54) 
214 Y. YAWN 
where v” = (4’, 0’)~ U,, is determined by 
and 
Then 
and 
(P”(x) = arg$(yx { - (cos 4(x)aV,(x; vO)/dx, + sin+(x)(dV,(x; vO)~~~.Y~)} 
w@)Gq, 
(55) 
V&T; do', 0") 2 V,(X; 4,0"> for any (4, O”)E U,, and all x cDo (57) 
J2($0, eo) I Jz((40, e) for any (4O, e+ u,,. (58) 
2.4 Computation of weak suboptimal Nash equilibrium point strategies 
The determination of v” = (4’, O”) by (55)-(56) is in itself a very difficult optimization 
problem. Furthermore, since the establishment of conditions for the existence of solutions 
{ I’,(.; v’), I’*(.; v’), Qo, v”> to th e complicated equations (53)-(56) seems to be even more 
difficult and lack any background in the theory of partial differential equations upon which 
to build, these problems are not considered here. 
In this section the following algorithm has been applied to equations (53~(56) for the 
computation of weak suboptimal Nash equilibrium point (WSNEP) strategies. 
ALGORITHM I
(1) Take v(“) = (c#J@), V  E UP, 
(2) Solve numerically the problem 
i 
9(+(n) e(n)) qx) = 0 
V,(x) =‘l, 
9 XED i= 1,2 
XEK; v,(x) = 0, x 4Do, 
V*(x) = 1, x E T; V&f) = 0, XEKU(D~~- T). 
The solutions to eqns (59) are denoted by I’,(. ; v(“)), i = 1,2. 
(3) Calculate P,(v(“)), i = 1,2, where 
(59) 
P,(v)& [rV.(x;v)dx/lrdx, i = 1,2 
where F c Do is a given domain. 
(4) Solve numerically the problem 
Y*(@‘))Q(x) = 1 - I’,(x; v’“‘), x f Do; Q(x) = 0, x $ Do. 
The solution to eqns (61) is denoted by Q(+;v(“)). 
(5) v @+I) = (4 (“+ I), V+‘)) is determined by 
cos 4’” + “(X) = -(a V,(x; v’“‘)/ax,)/Ll I”‘(x) 
sin 4’” + ‘j(x) = - (8 V,(x; v’“‘)/~x,)/d r’(x) 
I A’;‘(x) = [(a V,(x; v”“)/~x,)~ + (8 V,(.u; v(“‘)/~x,)‘]“’ 
(60) 
(61) 
(62) 
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cos 8’” + ‘)(x2) = A y)(xz)/A @)(x2), sin 8’” + ‘)(x2) = A y’(xJ/i (“)(xJ 
‘I ’ 
AI”’ = - 
1s 
Q(x; v’“‘)(a?‘,(x; v(“))/axJdx, dx, 
-I, 0 
4 ’ 
‘4 f’(x,) = 
ss 
Q(x; ,(“‘)(a V2(x; v(“J)/k?~~)dx, , 
-I, 0 
‘4 (“)(x& = [(A I”‘(x# + (A ~‘<x2)>23”2. 
(6) n + l+n and go to 2. 
The computations are continued until for some n 3 0, ]Pi(v(“+ “) - P,(v(“))I I co, i = 1,2, 
where co is a given positive number. 
For a given v(“), equations (59) and (61) have here been solved iteratively by using an 
upwind finite-differences method as described, for example, in [15]. Given h > 0, then 
whenever the algorithm given in this subsection converges, on a grid Do, on Do, the limit 
solutions will be denoted by ( V,“( .; ?‘), V2”(.; V”), Qh(*; ?“), Ch = (&“, eh)}. 
2.5 Results 
Equations (33)-(38) where solved for the following set of parameters: I, = 1 = 1, E = 0.1, 
0.90 - 
0.60 - 
0.50 - 
0.40 - 
0.30 - 
0.20 - 
0 $0 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.20 
Fig. 2. P,Jc.o.)= PAY*). i = 1.2, and P,@.o.)=P,(S*). i = 1,2, (c.o. = complete observation, 
p.o. = partial observation) as functions of c0 in the Blocking Game; u,Z= 5 x IO-), i = 1,2,3; 
u,=O.l, a=O.l,~=O.l, h=1118. 
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1.00 
0. so 
0.60 
0.70 
0.60 
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L 
a50 - 
P, (P.O.1 
0.40 - 
p( I co.1 
0.30 - 
cl20 - 
0.10 - 
0.00 - ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ 
0.10 0.12 014 0.16 0.16 0.20 
Fig. 3. P,@.O.) = P,(v*), i = I,& and P,@.o.) = P,(v‘*), i = 1,2, as functions of u,, in the Blocking 
Game; for a/=0.1, i = 1,2,3, u,=O.l, a=O.l, L =O.l, h = l/16. 
a =O.l, 0,*=~7~~=0~* -0.005, 0.01, 0.1; z&)=0.10, 0.11, 0.12 )....) 0.20; u,=O.lO, 0.11, 
0.12,. . . , 0.20; 6 =O.OOOl and h = I/16, l/18. 
Algorithm I for computing WSNEP strategies (Subsection 2.4) has been applied for 
the same set of parmaeters as above, with the exception of cl2 = oz2 = oj2 < 0.1 (the 
algorithm failed to converge for values of u12 = oz2 = oj2 significantly smaller than 0.1) and 
only for u0 = 0.1 and u,=O.ll, 0.12,.. ., 0.20. For all the cases where there was 
convergence it turned out that e”(x,) = 0,O -C x2 < 1. Due to this result, equations (33)-(35) 
where C#I is given by (36), (38) and 0(x,) = 0, 0 -C x2 < 1 have been soived for values of 
C12 = az2 = ox2 < 0. I. Throughout all the computations the set r, equation (60), was taken 
as 
l-‘&Ix :0.255x,10.75, i = 1,2; /x3] 10.5). 
Typical extracts from the numerical results are presented in Figs. 2 and 3. Table 1 
illustrates the performance of the algorithm for computing WSNEP strategies. 
In all cases v(O) = (c#J@‘, 8@) has been taken to be 
sin c#J(“(~) = x,/J(x, - x2)* + xt cos $(O)(x) = (x, - x&/J(x, - x2)* + x32 
sin B(o)(x2) = 0 cos B’O’(x*) = 1 (64) 
XED. 
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Table 1. The values of P,(v’“)), i = 1,2, for u0 = 0.1; u0 = 0.11, 0.12, (0.20; CT; = 0.1, i = 1,2,3; 
q, = low4 and h = l/l8 
n Pl(\'(")) P2("(")) 
0.11 0 
1 
2 
3 
0.12 
0.13 
0.14 
0.15 
0.16 
0.17 
0.18 
0.19 
0.20 0 
2 
3 
0.4024 0.2288 
0.4029 0.2253 
0.4030 0.2252 
0.4030 0.2251 
0.4009 0.2362 
0.4016 0.2321 
0.4016 0.2319 
0.4016 0.2319 
0.3994 0.2436 
0.4002 0.2388 
0.4003 0.2387 
0.4003 0.2386 
0.3978 0.2509 
0.3988 0.2455 
0.3989 0.2454 
0.3989 0.2453 
0.3961 0.2583 
a.3973 0.2523 
0.3974 0.2521 
0.3974 0.2521 
0.3944 0.2657 
0.3958 0.2590 
0.3959 0.2588 
0.3959 0.2587 
0.3926 0.2731 
0.3943 0.2656 
0.3944 0.2654 
0.3944 0.2653 
0.3908 0.2804 
0.3927 0.2722 
0.3928 0.2720 
0.3928 0.2719 
3.3890 0.2877 
0.3911 0.2788 
0.3912 0.2785 
0.3912 0.2785 
0.3870 0.2950 
0.3895 0.2853 
0.3895 0.285: 
0.3895 0.2850 
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3.1 Introduction 
Y. YAWN 
3. PATROLLING A CHANNEL 
Players P and E are moving in a channel described by the domain F (see Fig. 1). The 
game continues as long as the horizontal distance between P and E is less than 1,. Player 
E wishes to pass P (within a safe distance from P) before being intercepted by P, while 
player P wishes to intercept player E before E passes him. We assume that the equations 
of motion of P and E are given by (1) and (2) respectively, from which it follows that the 
equations of motion for the game are given by (4). 
The class r? of strategies is defined here in the same manner as in Subsection 2.1. Thus, 
given v = (&QE 0 and x EC%‘, equations (4) have a unique weak solution [,’ = {4,‘(t), 
t 2 0} (i.e. [,’ satisfies conditions (i)-(iii) of Subsection 2.1). 
Denote by D,,, K, T and D the following sets in W3: 
D,~{x:O<xi<f, i= 1,2; O<x,<l,) (65) 
KA(x:6 sxi<l-6, i= 1,2; 6 Ix,</,-6;; (x,-xX,)*+x;&} 
(66) 
TA{x:61xi11-6, i=1,2; x3 = 0; (x, - x2)2 + x3* 2 (E + u)‘} (67) 
DhD,-(KUT), (68) 
where I, 2 I > 0, a > 0, 0 < 6 + a < 1 and 0 < 6 $ I are given numbers. The constraint 
0 < x3 < I, in (65) describes the situation where in the channel F, P comes from the left 
and E comes from the right. Let t(x; v) denote the first exit time of [,” from D (.c(x; v) 
is defined here in the same manner as in (10)). 
The game continues as long as i,‘(t) ED. If l,‘(r (x; v)) E K then player P wins the game 
(since in this case P has intercepted E before E passed P and before either of the players 
has left Do). On the other hand, if c,‘(r(x; V))E T then player E wins the game (since in 
this case E passed P before being intercepted by P and before either of the players has 
left D,). If [,“(r(x; v)) E D,,” - T then the game terminates with both players losing the game. 
Let the class U, the functions I’,( *; v), I’,( .; v) and the class U, c U, be defined in the 
same manner as in (11x13) and (16) respectively. 
In the same manner as in the blocking game, two possible information structures 
available to P and E are given and the following associated problems are considered. 
(a) Strategies using complete observation of the state. Find a strategy v * = (4 *, 8 *) E U 
such that 
V,(x;+*,e*)r V,(x;&e*) for any(4,8*)EU and all xeD (69) 
V,(x;4*,8*)2 V,(x;4*,8) for any (4*,e)EU and all XED. (70) 
A strategy v* = (4 *, 8 *) E U for which equations (69x70) are satisfied is called here a 
NEP strategy (see Subsection 2.1). 
The results obtained in Section 2 can be applied to problem (a). In particular Theorem 
1; where Y(c#J,~), D,,, K, T and D are given by (5), (69, (66), (67) and (68) respectively; 
states sufficient conditions on NEP strategies for the game considered here. 
(b) Strategies using partial observation of the state. Find a strategy v” = (+O, 0”) E U, 
such that 
V,(X; c$O, 0”) 2 V,(x; &e”) for any (4, e”) E U, and all x E do 
J2(@, eo) I .f2(40, e) for any (40, e) o U, 
(71) 
(72) 
where J2(4, 0) is given by (17). A strategy v” = (+O, 0’) E U, for which equations (71) and 
(72) are satisfied is called here a WONEP strategy (see Subsection 2.1). 
The results obtained in Section 2 can be applied to problem (b). In particular Theorem 
2; where Y(4, e), Z*(4), Do, K, T, D are given by (5), (47), (65), (66), (67), (68) 
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respectively and where U,, is defined analogously to (42); states sufficient conditions on 
WONEP strategies (restricted to U,,) for the game considered here. 
Furthermore Algorithm I for the computation of WSNEP strategies (see Subsection 
2.4) can be applied to the game dealt with here. Another algorithm for computing WSNEP 
strategies denoted here as algorithm II, have been applied in this section. 
ALGORITHM II 
(1) Take @‘) such that (4,0(“))~ U,, for some 4. 
(2) Solve numerically the problem 
_Y(c#I, tY”))V,(x) = 0, x ED i = 1 9 9 2 
V,(x) = 1, x E K; VI(x) = 0, x $ D,, 
V*(x)= 1, XET; V&x)=0, XEKU(D;- T), 
cosd(x) = -(~~,(x)lWl4(x), sin4(x) 
= -(~~~(X)lwl~,(X) 
4(x) = [(a~,(x)lw2 + (w(ww211’2 
(73) 
(where L?(4,fl), Do, K, T and D are given by (5), (65), (66), (67) and (68) respectively). 
The solutions to equations (73) are denoted by $(“) and Vi( .; 4(“), V)), i = 1,2. 
(3) Calculate P.(v(“)) i = 1 2 v(“) = (4”“, 13(“‘), where Pi(v), i = 1,2 is given by (60). 
(4) Solve numeLcal1; the brbblem 
2*(4(“)>Q(x> = 1 - V2(x; v’“)), x E Do; Q(x) = 0, x #D,,, (74) 
(where _Y*($) is given by (47)). The solution to equations (74) is denoted by Q(*; v(“)). 
(5) e@+ ‘) is determined in the same manner as in equations (63). 
(6) n+l+nandgoto2. 
The computations are continued until for some n 2 0, [Pi(v(“+ ‘1) - Pi(v(“))I I 6, i = 1,2, 
where co is a given positive number. 
Given h > 0, then whenever algorithm II converges, on a grid Doh on Do, the limit 
solutions will be denoted by { Vlh( .; ?), I’,“( *; f*), Q”( .; ?‘), fh = ($“, @)>. 
3.2 Results 
Equations (33)-(38); where .Y($J, @, Do, K, T and D are given by (5) and (65)-(68) 
respectively; were solved for the following set of parameters: 1, = 2,1= 1, E = 0.1, a = 0.1, 
b = 10-4, oj2 = cTz2 = CT32 = 0.005, 0.1; u, = 0.11, 0.12, . . . ) 0.20; 00 = 0.11, 0.12, . . . ) 0.20; 
co = 5.10-’ and h = l/18. 
For the sake of comparison equations (33)-(35) together with (37) where 
cos 4 (x) = (x, - X,)/&X] - x2)2 + x32, sin 4 (x) = x3/ (x1 - x2)2 + x32 (75) 
(and _Y(#, 0), Do, K, T and D are taken as mentioned above) were solved for 
fJ,? = c 2 -0j2= 2 - 0.005, u,,=O.ll, 0.12, . . .,0.20; v,=O.ll, 0.12,. ..,0.20 and h = l/18. 
In this case player P applies a “line of sight” strategy (equation 75) and player E uses 
an optimal strategy with respect to 4. We denote this pair by (&os, &,,). The results 
indicate (as expected) that 
vltx;4*,e*) > VLx;4 Los, f&J for all x ED 
vz(x;4*,e*) < V,(X; +Los, eLos) for all x ED, (76) 
where (4 *, 0 *) is a NEP strategy. 
Algorithms I and II for computing WSNEP strategies (where U($, 0), D,, K, T, D are 
taken as mentioned above and -Y*(4) is given by (47)) haven been applied for the same 
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0.60 
0.00 1 ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ "0 - 
0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.20 
Fig. 4. P&.0.) = P,(v*). i = 1.2, and P,{v,s), i = I,2 (vtos is the strategy where player P applies 
a “line of sight” law and E plays optimally against P), as functions of u,, in the game of Patrolling 
a Channel; for u: = 5 x 10e3, i = 1,2,3; u0 = 0.1 and h = l/18. 
set of parameters as above with the exception of 6,2 = a22 = a3* < 0.1, and only for u,, = 0.1 
and u,=O.ll, 0.12,.. . ,0.20. The strategies gh were stored and were later used for the 
solution of (33)-(36) with 9 = e;“, for values of a,2 = az2 = aj2 I 0.1. Throughout all the 
computations the set F, equation (60), was taken as 
F={x:O.251x~~O.75, i= 1,2; 0.251x,1 1.75 
It turned out that for both Algorithms, I and II, Jh was almost the same function and that 
eh varies very little as u, varies. Typical extracts from the numerical results are presented 
in Figs. 4-6. Table 2 illustrates the performance of Algorithms I and II for computing 
WSNEP strategies. 
In all cases v(O) = (4(O), 19~‘)) has been taken to be 
cos ~(O)(X) = (x, - x2)/ (x1 - xJ2 + x,‘, sin ~(O)(X) = x,/ (x, - x*)2 + x,~ 
cos @O)(x,) = 0 , sin @O)(x,) = 1 (77) 
XED. 
4.1 Introduction 
4. THE COLLISION AVOIDANCE GAME 
In this section a stochastic version of a collision avoidance game in a channel is 
considered. (For deterministic versions of collision avoidance games in open sea, see [2] 
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1.00 
0.90 
O.Bo 
070 
060 
0.50 
0.40 
0.30 
0.20 
0.10 
0.00 
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030 0.92 a.t4 O.i6 0.16 0.20 
Fig. 5. &GO.) = (iv*), i = 1.2. and P,(p.o.) = P,(l;*), i = 1,2, as functions of u0 in the game of 
Patrollmg a Channel; for u,‘= 5 x 1W3, i = 1,2,3; q,=O.l and h - l/18. 
1 40 
Too 
0 60 
0 20 
-.20 
-.60 
-( 00 
t 
Sin 0 
000 0 .?I 0.22 0.33 0.44 0.56 0.67 0.78 0.89 I.00 114 
Kg. 6. (cos 8(x,). sin @(x~)) as functions of x? in the game of Patrolling a Channel; for o,~ = 0.1, 
i = 1.2.3: co = 0.1, u, = 0.15 and h = l/18. 
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Table 2. The values of PJd")), i = 1.2, for ~1~ = 0.1, u0 = 0.1 I, 0.12, (0.20; 0,: = ul? = 0~2 = 0.1, 
co = 10e4 and h = l/18 
Algorithin I Algorithm II 
U,-, n P&V(")) P&(")) P,(.("j) PJJ")) 
0.11 
0.12 
0.13 
0.14 
3.15 
0.16 
0.17 
0.18 
0.19 
0 
1 
2 
3 
0 
1 
2 
3 
0 
1 
2 
3 
0 
1 
2 
3 
0 
1 
2 
3 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0 
1 
2 
0.0730 0.0698 0.0773 0.0624 
0.0786 0.0636 0.0791 0.0617 
0.0788 0.0634 0.0792 0.0617 
0.0789 0.0634 0.0792 0.0617 
0.0750 0.0722 0.0795 0.0646 
0.0814 0.0660 0.0820 0.0640 
0.0817 0.0659 0.0821 0.0640 
0..0817 0.0658 0.0822 0.0640 
0.0770 0.0746 0.0817 0.0668 
0.0846 0.0684 0.0850 0.0664 
0.0848 0.0652 0.0852 0.0664 
0.0849 0.0682 0.0852 0.0664 
0.0790 0.0771 0.0839 0.0691 
0.0878 0.0708 0.0881 0.0688 
0.0880 0.0706 0.0884 0.0689 
0.0881 0.0706 0.0884 0.0689 
0.0810 0.0796 0.0861 0.0713 
0.0910 0.0733 0.0913 0.0713 
0.0913 0.0731 0.0917 0.0714 
0.0914 0.0731 0.0917 0.0714 
0.0830 0.0821 
0.0943 0.0757 
0.0947 0.0756 
0.0948 0.0755 
0.0949 0.0755 
0.0883 0.0736 
0.0946 0.0739 
0.0949 0.0739 
0.0950 0.0739 
0.0850 0.0846 
0.0978 0.0783 
0.0981 0.0781 
0.0983 0.0781 
0.0983 0.0781 
0.0905 0.0759 
0.0980 0.0765 
0.0984 0.0766 
0.0984 0.0766 
0.0870 0.0872 
0.1013 0.0808 
0.1017 0.0807 
0.1018 0.0807 
0.1018 0.0807 
0.0891 0.0898 
II.1048 0.0835 
0.1052 0.0834 
0.0928 
0.1014 
0.1018 
0.1019 
0.0950 
0.1050 
0.1054 
0.0783 
0.0792 
0.0792 
0.0792 
0.0806 
0.0819 
0.0819 
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Table 2 (Contd) 
Algorithm I Algorithm II 
" n 
0 
Pl(\'(")) P,(,..(")) P,("(")) P2("(")) 
3 0.1053 0.0833 0.1055 0.0819 
4 0.1053 0.0833 
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0.20 0 0.0911 0.0924 0.0972 0.0830 
1 0.1084 0.0861 0.1085 0.0846 
2 0.1089 0.0860 0.1091 0.0847 
3 0.1090 0.0860 0.1091 0.0847 
4 0.1090 0.0860 
and [16]). Players P and E are moving in a channel described by the domain F (see Fig. 
1). The game continues as long as the horizontal distance between P and E is less then 
I,. Both players wish to pass each other (within a safe distance between them). We assume 
that the equations of motion of P and E are given by (1) and (2) respectively, from which 
it follows that the equations of motion for the game are given by (4). 
The class 0 of strategies is defined here in the same manner as in Subsection 2.1. Thus, 
given v =(c$J,~)E~ and XE~?~; equations (4) have a unique weak solution 
i,’ = (C,‘(t), f 2 0} (i.e. C, satisfies conditions (i)-(iii) of Subsection 2.1). 
Denote by D,, K, T and D the following sets in il?: 
D,,~{x:O-~x~<l, i= 1,2; lx31 <I,} (78) 
K~(X:(X,-XJ2tZ; X3=0; 6IXiII-6, i=1,2) (79) 
TA(x:(x~-xJ<c; IXJIC; S SXiII-6, i= I,2} (80) 
DAD,-(KUT), (81) 
where 1,2 I> 0,O < 6 < 1 and 0 < E < 1 are given numbers. Let r(x; v) denote the first exit 
time of c,’ from D (7(x; v) is defined here in the same manner as in (10)). 
The game continues as long as C,‘(t) ED. If cX’(r (x; v)) E K then collision is avoided and 
both players win. If i,‘(r(x; V))E T then P and E collide and both players lose. If 
[,‘(z(x; v)) E D,’ then the game terminates with both players losing the game. 
Let the classes 0 and U be defined in the same manner as Subsection 2.1. Define, for 
v =((#&e)Eu 
Jqx; v>e P,‘((C,‘(z(x; V))EK)), x Ed@ (82) 
Two possible information structures available to P and E are considered here. The first 
possibility is that both players P and E have complete observation of c,’ = {l,‘(t), t 2 01. 
The second possibility is the case where P observes only its distance y, from the south bank 
of the channel and E observes only its distance yz from the south bank of the channel (see 
Fig. 1). Thus the two following problems are treated in this section. 
(a) Strategies using complete observation of the state. The problem treated for this 
information structure is: find a strategy v * = (4 *, 8*) E U such that 
V(x;+*,f?*)~ V(x;d,0) for any (&~)EU and all XED. (83) 
A strategy v* = (4 *, t?*) E U for which (83) is satisfied is here called an optimal strategy. 
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(b) Strategies using partial observation of the state. Let 
q,“(v E u :v = (4, e> = {(c#l(x,>, B(x2)), X:,.Y2ER} 
J(v) = J(q5,8) 4 
s 
(1 - V(x; q5, Q)‘dx, v E UP. 
Do 
(84) 
(85) 
The problem treated in this case is: find a strategy v” = ($O, 8’)~ U, such that 
A strategy v” = (c#IO, 0”) E UP for which (86) is satisfied is here called a weak optimal strategy. 
Note that the game considered in this section is a cooperative game in contrast to the 
previous games considered in this paper which are noncooperative games. 
4.2 Strategies using complete observation of the state 
Let the class 9 of functions V : R3+iR be defined in the same manner as in Subsection 
2.2. 
THEOREM 3 
Suppose there exists a strategy v* = (b, *, 8*) E U and a function V’E GS such that 
0 = cd~agrjj ~(4,e) v”(x) = -w *, 8 *) vo(x), x E D (87) 
,,:r& 
p(x)= I, XEK; V”(x)=O, XEZ-UD~~, 638) 
(where Y(c$,~) is given by (5)). 
Then 
v”(x>=P~(~~~(Z(X;V*))EK))2~.~((lrY(~(X;V))EK}) (89) 
for any v = (4, 0) E U and all x ads. 
The proof of Theorem 3 is similar to the proof of Theorem 1 (part (a)) and is therefore 
omitted. 
By assuming that there exists a strategy v * = (4 *, 8 *) E U and a function V” E 9 which 
satisfy equations (87)-(88), it follows that an optimal strategy may be found by solving 
the following problem: 
P'(&B)V(x)=O, XED; (90) 
V(x)= 1, XEK; V(X)=O,XETUD~ (91) 
where 
cos 4 (x) = - (a v(x)/ax,)/Ll,“(x) 
COST = (w(x)~x,)~~~(x) 
sin 4 (x) = - (a I/(x)/8x,)/d ,O(x) 
sin e(x) = -(~V(~)/d~,)/d~~(.x) 
(92) 
(93) 
A,“(x) = [(a V(X)/~X,)~ + (8 V(X)/~X,)~]“~, d;(x) = [(a V(X)/~X,)~ + (8 V(x)/~x,)‘]‘“. (94) 
If (9OF(94) have a unique solution V E 9 and (4, O), as determined by (92)-(94), is in U, 
then v = ($,O) is an optimal strategy. 
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Equations (90)--(94) have here been solved iteratively by using an upwind 
finite-differences method as described for example in [15]. 
4.3 Strategies using partial observation of the state 
In this subsection, sufficient conditions are derived on weak optimal strategies. 
Define the following operators: 
VEX, XED, (95) 
i=l 
and 
Y*Q(x)~($) i a,Z~2Q(~)/c?x,z, x EDO, 
i=l 
for all Q such that Z*Q E&(D~). 
Denote 
U,a (v = (c$,@)E U,: V(+; V)E~ and satisfies equations (90)-(91)} (97) 
Applying the same procedure as in the proof of Theorem 2 (i.e. the steps of the proof given 
by (46)-(52)), the following theorem is obtained. 
THEOREM 4 
Suppose that v” = (c#JO, e”) E U,, V( -; v’)E~ and Q. satisfy 
cY(c#~“, 0”)V(x; v”) = 0, x ED; (98) 
V(x,v”)= 1, xCz:K; V(x;v”)=O, XETUD,’ (99) 
P*Qo(x) = l- V(x; v”) a.e. in Do; Q,,(x) = 0, x ED:, (100) 
where v” = (4’, 0”)~ U, is determined by 
~0 = (40, 00) = ;;k3~;; o. J-i (cos4w Jo/J”, Qo(x)(JJ'(x; v)/%) dx, dx, 
Qo(x)(a J+ ; v >/ W dx, dxd dx, 
Qo(x W W; v YW &I ch (101) 
‘I 
+ sin&) 
s ,s 
_ , o’ Qo<x>@ W ; v >PJ dx, W h 
where v = (4,0)E U,. Then 
J(4 ‘, 0”) I J(4,0> for any (4,0) E U,. (1021 
Following the reasons stated in Subsection 2.4 an algorithm for computing weak 
suboptimal strategies is suggested here. 
ALGORITHM III 
(1) Take v(“) = (c#J(“), f?@)) E U, 
(2) Solve numerically the problem 
9(p) 2 eyv(x) = 0, XED; V(x)= 1, xgK; V(x)=O, XETUD,’ (103) 
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The solution to (103) is denoted by V( .; v@)). 
(3) Calculate P(v(“)) and J(v(“)), where 
P(v(“)) 0 
s 
V(x; v’“‘)dx/ dx 
r s r 
r c D, is a given domain and J(v) is defined by (85). 
(4) Solve numerically the problem 
.Y*Q(x) = 1 - V(x;v’“‘), x ED,; Q(x) = 0, x EI&=. 
The solution to (105) is denoted by Q( a; v@)). 
(5) v(“+l) = (4’““‘, tI(“+‘)) is determined by 
cos f#P+“(x,) = A,,(x,; V”‘)/A,(x,; v(“)) 
sin 4(“+ ‘)(x1) = A,,(x,; v(“))/A,(x,; v(n)) 
cos 8” + ‘)(x2) = -L&,(x*; V”))/A,(x,; v(“)) 
sin 0” + ‘$x2) = &(x2; v(n))/&& v(n)) 
1.00 - 
- PlC.O.1 IT; = 5.10-3 i =4,2,3 
0.90 - 
P t co.1 
0.80 - 
u; =o.a I =4.2,3 
0.70 - 
0.60 - 
0.50 - 
0.40 - 
0.30 - 
0.20 - 
0.40 - 
0.00 ’ * ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ 
0.40 0.12 0.44 0.46 0.16 0.20 
Fig. 7. P (c.o.) = P(v*) as functions of u, in Collision Avoidance game; for u* = 5 x 10e3, 10S2 
where u2 = u,~ = a,* = o,~; L = l/20, 6 = 1Oe4, v,, = 0.1 and h = l/18. 
(105) 
where 
The numerical solution of three stochastic differential games 
A,,(x,; v@))P JJ Q (x. v”“)(d V(x. v(“‘)/~x,)dx,dx, 3 9 0 -11 l ‘I /1,*(x,; v(R))a JJ Q (x. ~“‘)(a V(x; v’“‘)/c?x,) dx2 dx3 3 0 -11 
” A&x*; v'"')B JJ ‘Q (x; v’“‘)(J ?‘(x; v”“)/iYx,)dx, dx, -I, 0 
” &(x2; v”)) 62 JJ ‘Q(x; vc”+W(x; v(“‘)/c?x&x, dx, -I, 0 
A,(x,; V’“‘)e [A&(x,; v(n)) + /li,(x,; V”‘)]“2 
4(x,; V’“‘)e [(A$(x,; v(n)) + &(x2; v(“))]“2 
(6) n + I-WI and go to 2. 
I 
227 
(107) 
The computations are carried over fof 0 I n 5 N, where N is a given positive integer. Then, 
the weak suboptimal strategy FN = (4,,+ (I?~) is determined by 
CN = vtk) = ;a! ytnNJ(v@). 
= . . . . 
0.90 
PlC.0) 
0.80 
:_ - 
Pt P.0) 
0.70 
t 
0.60 - 
0.60 - 
0.40 - 
0.30 - 
0.20 - 
0.40 - 
0.00 1 % - 
0.10 0.12 034 0.16 0.16 0.20 
Fig. 8. P(c.0.) = P(v*) and &LO.) = P(GN’) as functions of I+, in the Collision Avoidance game; 
for LT? = lo-*, i = 1,2,3; c = l/20, d = IO-‘, o0 = 0.1, N = 10 and h = l/18. 
uw 
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For a given v@), equations (103) and (105) have here been solved iteratively by using an 
upwind finite-differences method as described in [15]. Given h > 0, then the weak 
suboptimal strategy V,,+ computed on a grid Doh on Do, is here denoted by ?.,,,” = ($,Vh, Ryh). 
4.4 Results 
Equations (90~(94) were solved for the following set of parameters: 1 = I, = 1; 
6 = 10e4, l/18; E = l/20, l/9, 2/9; uF= 5. 10e3, lo-*, i = 1,2,3; v,=O.l; uO=O.ll, 
0.12,. . . ,0.20 and h = l/18. 
Algorithm III for computing weak suboptimal strategies has been applied for the same 
set of parameters as above (with @e exception of a: = 5.10e3, i = 1,2,3, and 6 = 2/9) and 
with N = 10. 
Throughout all the computations the set I, equation (104), was taken as 
I-&(x :o<x,< 1, i = 1,2; O.OIX,IO.75). (109) 
In all cases v(O) = (4(O), 0(O)) was taken as 
cos 4(o’(x,) = 1, x, E (0,l); sin I = 0, x, E (0, l), 
cos @O)(x,) = 0, x2 E (0,l); sin @‘)(x,) = 1, x2 E (0,l). (110) 
Typical extracts from the numerical results are presented in Figs. 7-12. Table 3 illustrates 
0.60 P t CD.) I/ 
0.50 1 P~P.0.) I 
0.40 
F 
0.30 
t 
0.20 
f 
0.40 
i 
0.10 0.12 0.44 036 0.16 0.20 
Fig. 9. P(c.0.) = P(v*) and P@.o.) = P(VN”) as functions of u, in the Collision Avoidance game; 
for u,2 = 10m2, i = 1,2,3; 6 = l/9, 6 = l/18, u,=O.l, N = 10 and h = l/18. 
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1.00 - 
060 - 
0.20 - 
-.20 - 
-60 - 
-100 
0 00 0.11 022 0.33 0.44 0.56 0.67 076 0.89 9.00 1.11 
Fig. 10(a). (cos 4, sin 4) = (cos $flh(x,), sin d;Nh(x,)), as functions of x, in the Collision Avoidance 
game; for (I,?= IO-‘, i= 1,2,3; q,=O.l, u,=O.ll, e = l/20, 6 = lOe4, N= 10 and h = I/18. 
1.40 
Sin 8 
0.60 - 
000 0 11 0.22 0 33 044 0.56 0.67 0.76 0.69 1.00 4.49 
Fig. 10(b). (COST. sin -9) = (cos f&*(x& sin e,“(x,)) as function of x2 in the Collision Avoidance 
game: for u,‘= lo-:. i= 1.2.3; c,=O.l, u,=O.ll. c = l/20, 6 = 10e4, N = 10 and h = l/18. 
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-1.001 ’ ’ n ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ 
0.00 0.11 0.22 0.33 0.44 0.56 0.67 0.76 0.69 1.00 f.11 
Fig. 1 l(a). (COS 4, sin 4) = (cos dN,“(x,), sin JNh(x,)) as function of x, in the Collision Avoidance 
game; for uf= IO-‘, i = 1,2,3; o,=O.l, u,,=O.ll, L = l/9, 6 = l/18, N= 10 and h = l/18. 
1.40 
L 
Sin e 
0.60 - 
0.20 - 
-.20 - 
-.60 - 
\ 
-1.00’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ 
0.00 0.11 0.22 0.33 0.44 0.56 0.67 0.76 0.69 100 i t( 
Fig. 1 l(b). (cos0, sin 0) = (cos~~*(x~, sin gNh(xd) as function of x1 in the Collision Avoidance 
game: for uF= IO-*, i= 1,2,3; o,=O.l, %=O.ll, t = l/9, 6 = l/18, N= 10 and h = l/18. 
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1.40 
0.60 
0.20 
-.20 
-.60 
-1.00 
0.00 0.14 0.22 0.33 0.44 0.56 0.67 0.78 0.89 4.00 1.t1 
Fig. 12(a). (cos 4, sin 4) = (cos &“(x,), sin &*(x,)) as function of x, in the Collision Avoidance 
game; for 6: = 10e2, i = 1,2,3; u,, = 0.1, u, = 0.16, 6 = l/9, 6 = l/18, N = 10 and h = l/18. 
1.40 r- 
+.OO 
0.60 
020 
-.20 
-.60 
-t 00 
0 00 0.11 0 22 0.33 0.44 0.56 0.67 0.76 0.89 m0 4 11 
Fig. 12(b). (cos 0, sin 0) = (cos gN*(xJ, sinh fiN*(x&) as function of x2 in the Collision Avoidance 
game; for CT; = 10-2, i = 1,2,3; q, = 0.1, u, = 0.16, c = l/9, 6 = l/18, N = 10 and h = l/18. 
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Table 3. The values of P(v’“) and J(v’“), i = 1.. . k (where k is determined by (108)) for 
u,~=IO~Z,i=1,2,3;c=1/20,8=10~4,r,=0.1.u,=0.11.0.12 ._.., 0.19and/1=1.18 
u, 
0.11 
0.12 
0.13 
0.14 
0.15 
0.16 
0.17 
0.18 
0.19 
i P(v”‘) J(v"') 
0 
1 
2 
3 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0 
1 
2 
3 
3 
1 
2 
3 
0 
1 
2 
0 
1 
2 
0 
1 
2 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0.4743 
0.77!1 
,C T’nE .,/_A 
O.i7iS 
1.203: 
0.6992 
3.8’Xc c 
C.S933 
0.4932 ! .I837 
0.7783 0.8951 
0.7780 0.8903 
0.7798 0.8906 
0.1787 0.8905 
0.51Oi I.1680 
9.7844 C.8917 
0.7847 0.8884 
0.7860 0.8882 
0.5270 i.1534 
0.7899 ? .8388 
0.7906 a.0664 
3.7914 C.t?%J 
i.1339 
C.68i3 
0.8847 
0.5561: :.12.4 
0.79913 C.8843 
0.8003 0.8834 
0.5OE9 1.1159 
0.8029 O.E826 
0.8044 0.8823 
0.5610 
O.&I64 
l.iO53 
C.3611 
0.5922 I.0954 
0.8o'lb 0.6798 
the performance of Algorithm III for computing weak suboptimal strategies. The table 
shows the values of P(v”)) and J(v”‘), i = O,l, . . . , k, where k is determined by (108). 
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(1) Proof of Lemma 1 
APPENDIX 
Let R = C([O, co); I@) be the space of continuous functions from [0, co) into R’. Given I 2 0 and o l a, we 
use the notation o(t) = c(r, o) and set -K, = a[c(s):O I s I t] where c(f) denotes the map w+[(f, 0). 
Let 1’ = (+,0) E U, and x ED. From properties (i)-(iii) of Subsection 2.1 it follows that 
is a P,‘-martingale for any V E C0m(R3). By using Theorem 4.2.1 of [ 171 (we set in this case D = E, -/c, = 9, and 
P = P,“, see [17] for mor details) it follows that M,(V) is a P,‘-martingale for any V E C,2(R3). 
Let iD.k I be a sequence of bounded open subsets of D such that D, c D, + , n 2 1, and D = s D,. Also, “=, 
let {$.}F=, be a sequence such that {II/.}:_, & COm(H3) and I,” I +, I I,,+,, where I,,” is the indicator function 
of D,. Define V,,,a$.V, V ~9, and let r,(x;v) be the first exit time of c,“(r) from D,. Then M,(V& is a 
P,‘-martingale and so is M,,,“( V,,,). But 
and 
V,,,(i,‘0 A 7,)) = V(i,V A 7,)), (7” = 7,(x; v)) (112) 
U(v)V&,“(r)) = U(v)%“(r)), 0 ez r < 7,(x;v). (113) 
Thus M, n ,,( V), V E 9, is a P,‘-martingale. Since 7,(x; v) 7 7(x; v) P,Y-almost surely it follows that M, n ,(,,?(V), 
V E 9, is a P,“-martingale. Hence 
and consequently 
I 
, n *(I; v, 
V(x) = E,‘V(l,‘(f A 7(x; v)) - E,’ Y(v)V(i,‘(s))dr, r 2 0. (115) 
(I 
Since r(x; v) < co P,‘-almost surely (this is due to the fact that v E V) equation (115) implies (by letting r-co) 
r(x:vJ 
V(x) = E,‘V(~,‘(r(x; v)) - E,’ 
j 
~(v)V(i,‘(s)W, VEB. (116) 
0 
(a) Assume that V, EL? satisfies (22)-(23). Then (116) yields 
V,(x) = E,‘V,(i,“(r(x;v)) = V,(i,‘(r~x;v)))(~)P,“(do) 
= s V,(i,‘(~(x; v))(o)P,‘(do) + V,(i,‘(~(x; v))(o)J’,‘(do) (117) i0J ~I~I~HW)EK: 
P, (do ) (118) 
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where T = 5(x; v). Hence 
V,(x)=P,‘({i,‘(s(x;v))EKj). (118) 
(b) Let V*EC@ satisfy (22) and (24). Then equation (26) can be proved in the same way as that used in (a). 
(2) Proof of Theorem I
(a) Let?=(q5,6*)oU,xoDandassumethatv*= (I$ *, O*) E U and V,“EO satisfy equations (27) and (29). 
Then, from (116) and (27) we obtain 
5 V,‘(x) + E,’ Y(v l )V,“(l,‘(s))~ 
= V,O(x). (119) 
Also, by using Lemma 1, we have 
V,O(x) = P;({[;(r(x; v’)) EK}) 2 E,“V,‘(l,“(r(x; C))) 
= PJ({rJ(T(x;a))EK}). 
Hence 
(120) 
P:({[::(T(x;v*))EK}) 2 p,"({C:(r(X;f))EK}) (121) 
for any j=(4,O*)oCTand all ZED. 
(b) The second part of the theorem (i.e. equation 32) is proved in the same way as that used in (a). 
(3) Proof of Lumma 2 
From (40) and (41) it follows that 
[IV&-- v”J12=(!kVd- V”)=($, V,>-(kV”> 
i; ($9 v,> - <** v> = ($7 v, - v> 
5 l/$11 I/V,- VII = IIVd- PII [IV,- VII,for any Vog. 
Using the fact that V,#B, inequalities (122) yield 
I/V,-- V”ll 5 I/V,- VII, for any VEB. 
(122) 
(123) 
